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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal follows a legal malpractice case. The Plaintiff, Ms. Pamela Stephen, 
prevailed in her legal malpractice case against Attorney Scott Gatewood, and the law firm of 
Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered in the district court. 
In the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it identified and explained Ms. 
Stephen's contentions at trial. 
The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants were negligent in their representation of 
her by failing to obtain an equal division of community assets in the divorce. The 
Plaintiff asserts that she was suffering from a mental health condition that 
impaired her understanding of the proceedings and that she did not receive 
information about the divorce proceedings that would have allowed her to make 
knowing and intelligent decisions about the settlement that was reached. Further, 
the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants failed to properly investigate the fair 
market value of the Crescent Rim property and the correct amount of 
indebtedness owing against that property and thus, she received a less than 
equitable share of the community real property as a result of the failure of the 
Defendants to investigate those issues. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2) 
Contrary to the Appellant's claims, this appeal is not limited to "mentally impaired client" 
issues. Ms. Stephen claimed and proved she was mentally impaired to such a degree as to avoid 
any application of the defense of judicial estoppel. She also proved that Mr. Gatewood failed to 
provide Ms. Stephen with relevant information about Mr. Stephen's estimated value of the 
Crescent Rim property and about the validity of existing judgment liens against that property, and 







































as Ms. Stephen did not have such knowledge, judicial estoppel was equally inapplicable. Finally, 
Judge McLaughlin, following uncontroverted expert testimony, confirmed Mr. Gatewood's 
conduct fell below the standard of care when he failed to investigate the value of the Crescent 
Rim property and any attached liens. This failure directly and proximately caused Ms. Stephen 
damages as she received substantially less value in the property division than she would have had 
the Appellants acted within the standard of care. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Respondent generally agrees with the Appellants' rendition of the proceedings in the 
district court. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS - APPEAL and CROSS APPEAL 
Ms. Stephen hereby incorporates her Statement of Facts as stated in her original filing, and 
now adds facts relevant to the issues raised in the supplemental appeal and cross appeal. 
Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions to Gatewood during their initial meeting 
and Gatewood memorialized these disclosures in his notes. (plaintiff's Ex. 121.) Ms. Stephen 
disclosed she had 2 suicide attempts in the last 3 years, was "Bi-Polar," suffered from "post 
traumatic stress," and was on "medication." 
Ms. Stephen also stated she believed the value of the Crescent Rim home to be 
$400,000.00. (Plaintiffs Ex. 121.) 
Subsequently, Mr. Gatewood drafted and filed Answer and Counterclaim in which he 
pled; "That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable 
needs and due to physical an,d emotional limitations is unable to support herself through 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 3 
employment. (Plaintiffs Ex. 102.) (Emphasis added) 
Thereafter, Mr. Gatewood filed a Motion for Temporary Maintenance on August 4, 2003 
in which Ms. Stephen testified in support through affidavit, "As a result of my physical and 
mental and emotional limitations, I am not able to secure gainful employment to support myself" 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 110, p. 2.) 
Despite the burden of proof for the counterclaim for Spousal Maintenance, Gatewood 
admitted that he made the decision not to obtain Ms. Stephen's medical records. (Tr., pg. 166, 
LL. 14-29.) 
In the upper left-hand portion of Ms. Stephen's Mfidavit is the identification required by 
Rule 10, IRep, of the attorneys appearing of record; both Sallaz and Gatewood are identified with 
their respective Idaho State Bar Numbers, and below the attorney's information is the annotation 
"Attorneys for Defendants." (Emphasis added) (Plaintiff's Ex. 110.) 
Gatewood testified he withdrew Ms. Stephen's Motion for Temporary Maintenance 
because he thought that Ms. Stephen was essentially receiving de Jacto maintenance - not because 
she did not need or deserve it. (Tr., pg. 191, LL. 1-19.) 
In the underlying divorce proceeding, Mr. Stephen provided discovery responses on 
September 10, 2003 in which he responded to a request for his opinion of the fair market value of 
the community real property. Mr. Stephen opined the fair market value ofthe property was 
$500,000.00. (plaintiff's Exhibit 105, p. 2; Answer to Interrogatory No.1.) 
Mr. Stephen also listed the Beach Street rental property as both a community property 
asset and community property debt. (plaintiff's Exhibit 105, p. 2 and 4; Answer to Interrogatory 












































Nos. 1 and 3.) 
In these same responses, Mr. Stephen indicated his belief that Ms. Stephen was entitled to 
"one-half of the community property." (plaintiffs Exhibit 105, p. 11, Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 29.) 
Approximately a week later, Mr. Stephen provided supplement discovery responses in 
which he attached a lab report which appeared to indicate a positive response to a drug screen for 
amphetamine. (Plaintiff's Ex. 106.) 
On November 7,2003, Gatewood prepared and served his clients responses to discovery 
in the divorce action. In his reply to Interrogatory No.1, he indicates Ms. Stephen believed the 
value ofthe Crescent Rim property was $385,500.00, or one hundred fourteen thousand five 
hundred dollars less than Mr. Stephen's opinion of the value of the same property. (Plaintiffs 
Ex. 108, p. 2.) 
At trial, Gatewood could not recall discussing Mr. Stephen's $500,000.00 valuation with 
Ms. Stephen. (Tr., pg. 174, LL. 21 to pg. 175, LL. 1.) 
Ms. Stephen testified that she had not received any of Mr. Stephen's discovery responses, 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 105, 106 and 107.), before the divorce trial on August 5, 2004. (Tr., pg. 410, LL. 
12, to pg. 411, LL. 23.) 
Ms. Stephen also testified that she never reviewed any ofthe Plaintiff's discovery 
responses in the divorce case. (Tr., pg. 411, LL. 25, to pg. 412, LL. 3.) 
Gatewood noted in the divorce file that on January 27,2004, during a "phone call to 
client," Ms. Stephen inform«d Gatewood that a "Dr. wanted to hospitalize [Defendant] ["delta" 
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sign in original]," and that Ms. Stephen "has been in bed for 5 days." Gatewood noted, "she 
sounded groggy - not very responsive." (plaintiffs Ex. 122.) 
On July 27,2004, a week before the trial, Ms. Stephen called and spoke with Mr. 
Gatewood. During this conversation, Ms. Stephen told Mr. Gatewood she had been hospitalized 
for a week. (plaintiff's. Ex. 123.) Gatewood testified that despite his knowledge of Ms. Stephen's 
mental conditions he did not investigate the circumstances of Ms. Stephen's hospitalization. 
Gatewood testified that he did not inquire where she had been hospitalized or what necessitated 
the hospitalization. (Tr., pg. 215, LL. 1, to pg. 220, LL. 19.) 
Ms. Stephen testified she spoke with Gatewood the day before the trial, and asked him to 
seek to postpone the trial because she was not feeling well. She testified that Mr. Gatewood 
responded, "The judge doesn't do that mental health thing," and that if she wanted to delay the 
trial she would have to get a "note from her doctor". (Tr., pg. 413, L. 18, to pg. 416, L. 7.) 
At trial Ms. Stephen presented a "Satisfaction of Judgment" with an attached Writ of 
Execution, which indicated the "Crescent Rims Suit" judgment had been satisfied on June 23, 
2004 - well before the divorce trial. (plaintiff's Ex. 117.) 
Gatewood testified t4at he was aware of the encumbrance but did not know the status or 
validity on the day of trial. (Tr., pg. 607, LL. 4-12.) 
Gatewood then testified that he did not think, had Judgment been paid before the divorce 
was finalized, that it would have made any difference to the property division. (Tr., pg. 607, LL. 
13-16.) 
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce indicates in Exhibit A that the value ofthe Crescent 




















Rim property was $385,500.00. Mr. Stephen is also credited with $28,000 for the "Crescent Rim 
suit." (plaintiff's Ex. 103.) 
To equalize the division of property, Mr. Stephens would have had to pay approximately 
half of $65,000 on or about August 5, 2004. (Tr., pg. 516, L. 6, to pg. 516 L. 10.) 
Ms. Shepard testified the parties agreed to monthly payments to satisfy the equalization of 
the division of community assets because Mr. Stephen was unable to pay a lump sum payment at 
that time. (Tf., pg. 516, LL. 11 - 25.) 
The Decree provides for payment of $2000.00 per month, minus rent as "equalization 
payments." (plaintiff's Ex. 103.) 
There is no indication on the audio recording of the divorce trial on August 5, 2004, that 
Gatewood informed Judge Day that his client had recently been involuntarily committed to a 
psychiatric ward, that his client was taking a substantial amount of potentially mind-altering or 
cognitive-impairing medications, or that his client had just asked Mr. Gatewood to seek to 
postpone the trial until she felt better. (Defendant's Ex. 210.) 
The audio recording of the divorce trial confirms that Ms. Stephen, when asked by Judge 
Day if she agreed to the settlement as presented "is a complete resolution of all the property and 
debt division issues in your divorce case," she responded, "As far as I know." (Defendant's Ex. 
210.) 
Ms. Stephen presented evidence that spousal maintenance was an issue for Ms. Stephen 
throughout the divorce trial. Gatewood filed a counterclaim seeking spousal maintenance 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 102.), and then filed a motion for temporary maintenance in August 2003 
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(plaintifrs Ex. 110.). Gatewood then discussed this issue with the Court during the May 3,2004 
status conference, (Plaintiff sEx. 113.), and again during the pretrial conference on July 19, 2004. 
(Plaintifrs Ex. 114.) While Ms. Stephen withdrew her claim for spousal maintenance in this 
case, that issue is relevant to determine Ms. Stephen's state of mind on August 5,2004, when she 
appeared for trial expecting to receive spousal maintenance. 
In discovery responses in this case dated February 7,2007, Mr. Gatewood alleged that Ms. 
Stephen only filed this case "after her temporary maintenance ended." (Plaintiffs Ex. 118, p. 2, 
Answer to Interrogatory No.6.) (Emphasis added). 
Ms. Shepard testified the parties agreed to monthly payments to satisfy the equalization of 
the division of community assets because Mr. Stephen was unable to pay a lump sum payment at 
that time. (Tr., pg. 516, LL. '11-25.) 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW - APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL 
This Court will review a trial court's decision to ascertain "whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions oflaw." Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 
P.2d 253, 256 (1991). This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 
(1997). Thus, if the findings offact are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, although conflicting, this Court will not disturb those findings. Carney 
v .. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 281, 985 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1999). 
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 135 Idaho 316, 318, 17 P.3d 
260, 263 (2000). 



































ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether there was substantial and competence evidence to support the Court's Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law - regardless of the Respondent's mental condition? 
2. Whether the Appellants were entitled to the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel or 
judgmental immunity when the evidence indicates the Respondent was unaware of certain 
important facts? . 
3. Whether the Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal 
according to Rule 40, IAR, Rule 41, IAR and I.C. § 12-120(3)? 
ill. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred when it reduced the equalization payment to which the 
parties agreed in consideration for Mr. Stephen having 24 months to pay to equalize the 
community estate? 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it found that Mr. Sallaz was not personally liable to 
the Respondent, when the law firm was a partnership, and when Sallaz had appeared as 
her attorney of record, yet did nothing to ensure her case was pursued appropriately? 
3. Whether the Cross Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on this 
cross appeal according to Rule 40, IAR, Rule 41, IAR and I.e. § 12-120(3)? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT - APPEAL 
A. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN'S RULING THAT GATEWOOD'S CONDUCT FELL 
BELOW THE STANDARD OF CARE - REGARDLESS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MENTAL STATE. 
The majority of the Appellants' argument on appeal addresses a claim that Judge 
McLaughlin somehow erred when deciding the negligence issue as applied to a mentally impaired 
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or mentally diminished client. However, the Court clearly reached its decision based the 
alternative that Gatewood failed to provide Ms. Stephen with relevant information - regardless of 
her mental state. 
Even assuming the Plaintiff was not impaired, the issue of the investigation 
by Gatewood as to the valuation of the Crescent Rim property demonstrates an 
additional breach of duty on the part of Gatewood. Stephan initially placed a value 
of $500,000 on the property and the Plaintiff initially placed a value of $400,000 on 
the property. This is a significant disparity as testified to by Ms. Naugle. 
The evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was not advised by Gatewood that 
Stephan had placed a value of $500,000 on the Crescent Rim property. The Plaintiff 
was not aware of this even at the time of negotiations for the division of community 
real property. This is vital information to a party to divorce litigation because the 
higher value may have been the correct value for the property. 
Ms. Naugle testified as an expert on behalf ofthe Plaintiff that Gatewood 
failed to meet the applicable standard of care for an attorney practicing in 2003 and 
2004 by not seeking a comparative market analysis of the Crescent Rim property. 
Even if the Plaintiff was short of funds, Ms. Naugle testified that a real estate 
agent, at little or no expense, could have shed more objective light on this real 
property valuation issue. As Ms. Naugle testified, this variance is too significant to 
rely on the client's information alone. (Naugle Testimony, Tr., p. 268, L. 11, to p. 
269, L. 4.) 
What is of concern to the Court is that Stephen, who initially gave an 
opinion that the property was worth $500,000, was awarded the residence. 
Gatewood testified that he had heard from Stephen's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the 
Plaintiffwas very knowledgeable about the fair market value of the residence. 
However, in light of the fact that the Plaintiff was possibly impaired from 
methamphetamine use and was, by Gatewoods's own notations in her file, showing 
signs of deterioration as to her mental health, he breached the duty he owed to his 
client when he failed to investigate this critical valuation issue in this case. The 
$385,000 that the Plaintiff had subsequently indicated the property value on the 
Crescent Rim property to be worth was the valuation used in the calculation of the 
division of the community real property. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 9, L. 24 to p. 11, L. 4.) 
The Court's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 







































First, as Judge McLaughlin noted, Mr. Stephen provided discovery responses in the 
divorce case and in response to a request that Mr~ Stephen "describe all real property which you 
claim is community property of you and the Plaintiff [sic] and state your estimate of the value of 
said property," Mr. Stephen responded that he estimated the value of the Crescent Rim home to 
be "500,000.00." (plaintiffs Ex. 105, p. 2.) Mr. Stephen also indicated that he believed the 
Defendant Ms. Stephen was entitled to "one-half of the community property." (plaintiff's Ex. 
105, p. 11.) Mr. Stephen provided these responses in September 2003; well before Ms. Stephen 
provided her responses. 
At trial, Gatewood could not recall reviewing these responses, could not recall discussing 
these responses or Mr. Stephen's value with Ms. Stephen, nor could Gatewood provide any 
evidence that he or his office ever sent a copy of the responses to Ms. Stephen. Sallaz also 
testified that he never met personally with Ms. Stephen. 
Ms. Stephen testified at trial she never received a copy of Mr. Stephen's discovery 
responses or knew he had valued the property at $500,000.00. 
Thereafter, Mr. Stephen responded by sending similar requests. Ms. Stephen, after 
meeting with Gatewood or his staff members, replied that in her opinion the value of the Crescent 
Rim property was $385,000.00. (Plaintiffs Ex. 108, p. 2.) 
A reasonable person could deduce, based on Ms. Stephen's response that neither she nor 
Gatewood knew that Mr. Stephen had placed a substantially higher value on the property, because 
her response had the net effect of reducing the value of Ms. Stephen's portion of the community 
estate by approximately $57,500.00. 
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That deduction is sound as it applied to the attorney as based on Mr. Stephen's 
$500,000.00 opinion it is unclear why any attorney would advise his client to essentially bid 
against herself and provide a lower value when doing so would negatively impact the ultimate 
value of the community estate. A reasonable attorney, assuming that attorney had read the 
opposition's discovery responses, would have advised his client to either agree with the 
$500,000.00 figure unless the client could prove the figure was low, or could provide some 
indication to the Attorney as to why the client was insisting the value was less than proposed. If 
the client proceeded to dema.nd the property was valued less - essentially bidding against herself, 
when the net result would have substantially reduced the value of the community estate, the 
Attorney would be on notice that perhaps his client is not acting rationally. 
That deduction is equally valid as applied to the client. Assuming the client had a full 
understanding of the facts - that the opposition had placed a value on an asset in a verified 
discovery response and that value would probably be upheld in Court unless the client could 
prove the value was understated, then it is nonsensical for a client to offer a lower opinion of 
value, as doing so would be financially detrimental. 
The reality, as Judge McLaughlin concluded based on the evidence, is the Appellants 
failed to read Mr. Stephen's discovery responses and had no idea of the $500,000.00 valuation, 
nor had any idea throughout'their representation, and even on the date of trial. Further, the 
Court's conclusion that Ms. Stephen had no knowledge of the $500,000.00 valuation is equally 
supported. No reasonable person, with full knowledge and understanding of the facts, would have 
acted in such a manner. 


















The Court's ruling on the $28,000 judgment lien was also supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
There was a claim in this case that there was a $28,000 judgment lien 
against the Crescent Rim property that should not have been listed as a debt in the 
presentation to Judge Day. Exhibit 117, the $28,000 indebtedness against the 
Crescent Rim property as set out in the decree of divorce had in fact been paid 
nearly two months prior to the divorce trial. The Plaintiff indicated that she did not 
know the status of this debt when she answered the request for discovery in Exhibit 
108. Other than the list of debts set forth in Exhibit A attached to the divorce 
decree and Stephan's answer to Interrogatory No.3, no other investigation was 
done by Gatewood to determine the status of this debt. Gatewood should have 
obtained documentation as to this debt prior to the settlement agreement. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 13, LL. 11-20.) 
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce indicates in Exhibit A Mr. Stephen was credited 
with $28,000 for the "Crescent Rim suit." (Plaintiff's Ex. 103.) 
At trial, Ms. Stephen presented evidence that this "debt" was satisfied as of June 23, 2004 
and before the divorce. Mr. 'Stephen apparently paid the underlying judgment of $29,83 5.44, plus 
accruing interest and costs for a total of$30,214.79, before the divorce was finalized with 
community funds. l As this debt was paid, Mr. Stephen was not entitled to a $28,000.00 "credit" 
for this debt in the property settlement agreement. (Plaintiff sEx. 117.) 
At trial, Ms. Stephen proved that the Appellants failed to read or consider Mr. Stephen's 
discovery responses, that the Appellants had no idea of the circumstances surrounding the lien 
created as a result of the "Crescent Rim suit," and that the Appellants failed to conduct even a 
minimal or cursory investigation to determine the source, validity or status of the resulting lien. 
1 The Appellants suggested at trial that Mr. Stephen had paid the judgment from separate property funds, but failed to 
support such a claim with any evidence. 
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Judge McLaughlin correctly ruled that under the circumstances, the Appellants' conduct fell 
below the standard of care. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DID 
NOT APPLY. 
The application of judicial estoppel is not absolute. The Supreme Court in McKay v. 
Owen, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, (1997) discussed criteria that would preclude the 
application of judicial estoppel under the appropriate circumstances. 
This decision does not mean that attorneys will never be accountable for their 
negligence whenever there has been a settlement in the underlying transaction. If a 
client does not learn of the grounds for, or facts giving rise to, legal malpractice 
until after the settlement has been approved, the policies behind judicial estoppel 
will not be furthered, and the doctrine should not be employed. For guidance 
purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should be made 
clear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining the 
inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge 
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another 
way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party 
states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should have 
known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that 
the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is 
determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with the court. 
McKay v. Owen, 130 Idaho at 155. (Emphasis added) 
Judge McLaughlin properly denied this defense based on the evidence that Ms. Stephen 
never knew about the substantial value that Mr. Stephan has placed on the Crescent Rim property 
or that Mr. Stephen had paid the judgment lien prior to the trial. As Ms. Stephen had no 
knowledge of these facts, judicial estoppel cannot apply. 







































C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The Appellants cite to Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roberston & Tucker, 133 
Idaho 1,981 P.2d 236 (1999), and argue they are entitled to reversal based on application of 
"judgmental immunity." This was a case of first impression in Idaho for application of this 
principle and the Supreme Court articulated its understanding of the requisite elements. 
The "rule" as applied in other jurisdictions has been articulated in different 
ways.(fn1) Most commonly it appears that the courts have simply ruled that in 
certain circumstances an attorney is not liable "as a matter oflaw" and thus, the 
issue need not be submitted to a jury for decision. All courts acknowledge the 
standard of care with which all attorneys must comply and that is: they are held to 
that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and 
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. The courts have then held 
as a matter of law that an attorney cannot be held liable for failing to correctly 
anticipate the ultimate resolution of an unsettled legal principal. See, e.g., 
Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash.App. 708, 735 P.2d 675, 681 (1986). 
Other courts have stated that, in the context of litigation, an attorney will not be 
held liable for a mere error in judgment or trial tactics if the attorney acted in good 
faith and upon an informed judgment. See, e.g., Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 
532 N.W.2d 842, 847 (1995). The "non-liability" rule in both situations, 
however, is conditioned upon the attorney acting in good faith and upon an 
informed judgment after undertaking reasonable research of the relevant 
legal principals and facts of the given case. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.3d 
349, 118 Cal.Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (1975). In other words, an attorney 
must act with that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly 
possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. 
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roberston & Tucker, 133 Idaho at 4-5. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Ms. Stephen proved that the Appellants failed to investigate her medical conditions, failed 
to review Mr. Stephen's discovery responses, failed to provide Mr. Stephen's discovery responses 
to Ms. Stephen or even discuss the information contained in those responses, failed to investigate 
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the value of the real property, and failed to investigate and determine the validity of the status of 
the judgment lien on the Crescent Rim property. 
First, it would appear no judgment or opinion could be "informed" when the attorneys 
rendering the opinion lacked knowledge of relevant facts. Then, refusal to apply judgmental 
immunity is warranted in this case as all of the relevant facts were available to the Appellants 
with minimal effort. They simply refused to review the information they had obtained through 
discovery or failed to exert minimal effort to obtain information they knew existed. 
Clearly, the Appellants are not entitled to judgmental immunity as Judge McLaughlin 
ruled, as the evidence establishes a lack of even minimal research or investigation. 
D. JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD AND HIS 
FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
The Appellants filed a counterclaim in which they alleged Ms. Stephen, " ... lacks 
sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional 
limitations is unable to support herself through employment. (plaintiffs Ex. 102.) (Emphasis 
added) However, despite th~s pleading, and the associated duty for the attorney to investigate the 
allegations, (Rule 11(a)(1), IRCP.), the Appellants did nothing to determine the validity of this 
claim. 
Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions to Gatewood at their initial meeting, and 
that disclosure prompted the Appellants to draft and file a counterclaim that include the allegation 
stated above as a basis for spousal maintenance. (plaintiffs Ex. 120-12l.) 
Gatewood documented a phone call on January 27,2004, during which Ms. Stephen 






































informed Gatewood that a "Dr. wanted to hospitalize [Defendant] ["delta" sign in original]," and 
that Ms. Stephen "has been in bed for 5 days." He also noted that "she sounded groggy - not very 
responsive." (plaintiffs Ex. 122.) 
Then just a week before trial, Ms. Stephen told Gatewood she had in fact been 
hospitalized. (plaintiffs. Ex. 123.) Despite his knowledge of Ms. Stephen's mental conditions 
Gatewood did absolutely nothing - he did not even enquire why she had been hospitalized, where 
she had been hospitalized, or her current status - whether she was under a doctor's continuing 
care. (Tr., pg. 215, LL. 1, to pg. 220, LL. 19.) 
As noted above, Ms. Stephen testified she spoke with Gatewood the day before the trial, 
and asked him to seek to postpone the trial because she was not feeling well. She testified that 
Mr. Gatewood responded, "The judge doesn't do that mental health thing," and that if she wanted 
to delay the trial she would have to get a "note from her doctor." (Tr., pg. 413, L. 18, to pg. 416, 
L. 7.) 
In the Court's Findings of Facts, it noted its basis for the decision - namely that Gatewood 
had many indications that should have alerted him to investigate Ms. Stephen's medical 
conditions, notwithstanding his duty under Rule II(a)(I), IRCP, but he simply chose not to seek 
that information. The Court's ruling is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
When a client has been involuntarily hospitalized and the client's attorney 
has had to go to the client's home to communicate with that client on ten occasions, 
there is obviously a problem that should have been addressed by Gatewood either 
through contact with the Plaintiffs medical providers to determine her level of 
impairment or appointment of a guardian ad litem. In the alternative, Gatewood 
should have advised Judge Day of the recent hospitalization so that a continuance 
could have been granted to give the Plaintiff additional time to process these issues 
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or for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. This is clearly allowed under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and not a violation of client confidences. Gatewood 
had more than ample information and personal observations that should have 
alerted as to his duty to inquire further about the Plaintiff's mental health status. 
Other than Gatewood's testimony, no other lawyer expert testified for the 
Defense on this issue of duty or for that matter any other aspect of the issue of 
negligence. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2.) 
The Appellants argue notwithstanding their lack of even minimal investigation or 
diligence, it really did not matter because Ms. Stephen still received a "good dea1." 
Scott Gatewood was confronted with a situation in which the best opportunity for a 
favorable resolution of the case for his client was the settlement offered by Ann 
Shepard. Mr. Gatewood testified about unfavorable issues that were emerging in the 
case that had not been disclosed to him by Pam Stephen. (Tr., pg. 184, L. 2 to pg. 
186, L. 24). Ms. Shepard had advised Scott Gatewood that considering the 
underlying facts of this particular case, that she thought she could get a better deal 
for Gary Stephen if they went to trial, but was willing to make the favorable offer in 
order settle the matter without a trial. (Tr., pg. 510, L. 12 to pg. 513, L. 5). Scott 
Gatewood concurred with Ms. Shepard's assessment that he would be unlikely to 
obtain a better deal for his client, Pam Stephen, at trial, than he would be able to 
obtain through the offered settlement. (Tr., pg. 184, LL. 2-22). 
Appellants' Brief, p. 44. 
However, this was an irreconcilable differences divorce, so it is unclear just what the 
Appellants mean by "getting a better deal" at settlement as opposed to going to trial? Assuming 
he had read Mr. Stephen's discovery responses, Gatewood could easily have argued at trial the 
Court should have used Mr. Stephen's figures, and therefore increased the value of the estate by 
nearly $60,000.00 to his client. What about the $28,000.00 lien? The net effect of that error cost 
Ms. Stephen $14,000.00. If the case went to trial, the judge would have to have discounted the 
$28,000 credit to Mr. Stephen because the debt was paid. 







































The Appellants also raise the issue of the quitclaim deed for the Beach Street rental 
property. Contrary to the Appellants' contention the Beach Street rental property was Mr. 
Stephen's separate property based on a quitclaim deed, the property was purchased with 
community funds during the marriage, the mortgage was paid for with community funds, and Mr. 
Stephen would have testified to these facts. Moreover, the Appellants failed to introduce the deed 
into evidence at trial. All this Court has for evidence on appeal is Mr. Stephens' verified 
testimony in a discovery response that the Beach Street property is community property and 
subject to community debt. (plaintiffs Ex. 105, p. 2 and 4.) 
The Appellants also argue that there was evidence that Ms. Stephen had committed 
"waste" and if the case went to trial, Mr. Stephen would have been entitled to an offset for the 
alleged waste. Although Ms. Shepard testified she was going to claim Ms. Stephen had 
committed waste, she testified at trial she had no proof that Ms. Stephen was responsible for any 
damage to either residence or had made any improper payments from community funds. 
The bottom line, the Appellants failed even to do minimal investigations regarding the 
community or separate property assets and then ignored or disregarded what evidence they did 
obtain through discovery. The Appellants could not go to trial because they were completely 
unprepared and uninformed, not because of some feigned contention they did the best they could 
have done for their client. 
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E. THERE IS MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR A LAW FIRM - AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
In the case below, Appellant Sallaz represented through discovery, " ... during the time of 
the divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-01151D, this Defendant was associated with attorney Scott 
Gatewood there were both members of the corporation Sallaz & Gatewood." (plaintiff's Ex. 119, 
p. 2, Response to Interrogatory No.4.) (Emphasis added). However, the fee agreement at issue 
was signed on June 16,2003, (plaintiff's Ex. 100.), but Sallaz and Gatewood was not formed as a 
corporation until September 9,2003. (Plaintiffs Ex. 129 and 130.) At trial, when confronted with 
these facts, Gatewood testified that he and Sallaz were a partnership before forming their 
"professional services" corporation. (Tr., p. 138, LL. 2-25.) 
Ms. Stephen asserted below that Sallaz was jointly and severally liable to her for her 
damages as she contracted with Sallaz & Gatewood when it was a partnership, and as there was 
no evidence that Sallaz & Ga.tewood merged their partnership into the corporation, or that the 
corporation had acquired, ratified or assumed the contractual obligations of the partnership. 
Judge McLaughlin considered the arguments, but concluded that as Sallaz & Gatewood, CHDT. 
had formed and the negligence occurred after the formation, then I.e. § 30-1306 would apply and 
shield Sallaz from personal liability unless Sallaz had rendered legal services personally or had 
been supervising Gatewood. 
On appeal, it appears that the Appellants are agreeing with Ms. Stephen and the Court 
should not have found the professional service corporation liable, but as Sallaz & Gatewood was 
a partnership, Sallaz and Gatewood are liable jointly and severally. Based on that argument, Ms. 




















Stephen would concede this issue and on remand the Court should enter judgment against Sallaz 
and Gatewood jointly and severally, and not against the law firm. 
To the extent the Appellants are arguing that their professional services corporation is not 
liable for the actions of its "officers, shareholders, agents or employees," then the Appellants are 
ignoring the clear language ofldaho Code § 30-1306. 
30-1306. Professional relationship unaffected -- Personal and corporate 
liability. Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, 
modify, restrict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the 
professional relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the 
professional services and the person receiving such professional service and to 
the standards for professional conduct. Any officer, shareholder, agent or 
employee of a corporation organized under this act shall remain personally and 
fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct 
committed by him, or by any person under his direct supervision and control, 
while rendering professional services on behalf of the corporation to the person 
for whom such professional services were being rendered. The corporation shall 
be liable up to the full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or 
misconduct committed by any of its officers, shareholders, agents or employees 
while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation in the rendering of 
professional services. 
* * * 
After losing this case, Sallaz & Gatewood formed a professional limited liability company 
on March 9,2009, through which they claim to be providing "legal services." Even assuming 
their entity is now a professi9nallimited liability company, although there is no record they 
terminated their previous partnership or professional services corporation or that they have 
merged these entities, the limited liability company would also be directly liable for Gatewood's 
negligence. 
30-6-201A. Professional company. (1) Section 30-6-201, Idaho Code, shall not be 
deemed to authorize a professional company to render allied professional services 
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where the laws pertaining to specific professions or the codes of ethics or 
professional responsibility of any of the professions involved in such a proposed 
professional company prohibit such a combination of professional services. 
* * * 
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, modify, 
restrict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the professional 
relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the professional services 
and the person receiving such professional services or to the standards for 
professional conduct. Notwithstanding section 30-6-304(1), Idaho Code, any 
manager, member, agent or employee of a professional company organized under 
this chapter shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any 
negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person 
under his direct supervision and control, while rendering professional services on 
behalf of the professional company to the person for whom such professional 
services were being rendered. The professional company shall be liable up to the 
full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct 
committed by any of its managers, members, agents or employees while they are 
engaged on behalf of the professional company in the rendering of professional 
services. 
* * * 
Again, in consideration of the clear wording of these statues, the Appellants' contention 
"Idaho Law appears to be unequivocal in its provisions that a law firm, as an entity, cannot be 
directly sued for, or held liable for malpractice," is without basis in law or fact. 
F. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Stephen requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), Rule 41, IAR, and City 
a/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), and costs according to Rule 40, IAR if 
she is the prevailing party on appeal. 










































ARGUMENT - CROSS APPEAL 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REDUCED THE DAMAGE AWARD. 
In its decision the Court noted, "The damages issue in this case is clouded in part due to 
the fact that only portions of the property distribution in the divorce were address in the Plaintiff s 
damage claims.,,2 While the observation may be accurate, Ms. Stephen's strategy at trial was 
dictated by the parties' actions in the underlying divorce case. First, the parties had not identified 
the values of the lion's share of the personal property, but only indicated in the property 
settlement agreement which party was to receive that specific property. Frankly, it would have 
taken days of testimony, (if not weeks) to address the stated value of each lamp and end table. 
The value ofthe vehicles was another issue. Most ofthe vehicles listed were not available 
to be appraised or it simply was not cost effective to pursue valuing those assets. Finally, the only 
assets other than the vehicles the parties actually identified values for in the decree were the 
retirement accounts, the real property and certain debts that Mr. Stephen was assuming. As a trial 
tactic, Ms. Stephen chose to address only those items that she could prove were significantly 
undervalued or had been misapplied in some manner. She therefore concentrated on the Crescent 
Rim property and the paid judgment as the damages resulting from her attorneys' negligence and 
informed Judge McLaughlin of this intention pre-trial. 
Ms. Stephen raises this issue on appeal as she believed the Court erred in its application 
and reduction of the damages award by reducing the $41,500 it calculated as Ms. Stephen's 
2 Findings of Fact, p. 12. 
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damages by $14,065. In its decision, the Court stated, "The actual equalization was $33,935 (112 
of$67,870), when in fact the Plaintiff received $48,000.00 thus there was $14,065 paid in excess 
of the equalization.,,3 Ms. Stephen respectfully asserts that reducing the award under the 
circumstances was error. 
1. The Court Should Not Have Disturbed The "Equalization" Payment Agreement. 
The testimony by Mr. Stephen's attorney at trial confirmed Mr. Stephen agreed to the 
$2,000.00 monthly "equalization" payments because he did not have the cash to pay Ms. Stephen 
$33,935.00 in August 2004 to equalize the property distribution. Consequently, Mr. Stephen, 
through his counsel negotiated a $2,000.00 payment for 24 months so that he did not have to pay 
Ms. Stephen $33,935 at thaHime. In other words, Mr. Stephen agreed to pay more than the 
equalization payment in consideration of the benefit he would obtain by not having to pay Ms. 
Stephen $33,935 in August 2004 when she was entitled to receive this money. 
Ms. Stephens argues that as the "equalization" agreement was fully executed, there was no 
legal or factual basis for the Court to have set aside this contract and doing so now provides a 
benefit to the Appellants. During the trial below the Appellants presented no facts or legal 
argument to support rescinding this executed contract. The Appellants never called Mr. Stephen, 
so there was no testimony from him that regardless of the increased valuation of the Crescent Rim 
home and the deduction for the paid judgment he would have had cash to pay Ms. Stephen in 
August 2004 or that he would not have agreed to similar "equalization" payments considering the 
new amounts. 
3 Findings of Fact, p. 14. 
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Even without Mr. Stephen's testimony, based on the undisputed fact that Mr. Stephen did 
not have the money to pay Ms. Stephen $33,935 in August 2004, as confirmed by Ms. Shepard, 
when considered in light of the Court's ruling that added $83,000.00 to the value ofthe estate, 
there is no doubt that Mr. Stephens would not have had the money to pay Ms. Stephen in cash for 
the increased value of the estate had the Appellants in this case not committed negligence. Mr. 
Stephen therefore had to make some accommodation at the original trial and it is equally likely 
that under the circumstances created by the Court's ruling Mr. Stephen would have had to make 
similar arrangements to pay his debt to Ms. Stephen. For the ruling to stand there had to have 
been evidence that Mr. Stephen could have been able to pay Ms. Stephen in cash in August 2004 
to equalize the distribution of assets. Without such proof, and there was no evidence presented to 
support such a contention, to deduct the full $48,000 as of August 2004 as ifit had been paid is 
clear error. Under the circumstances, as the "equalization" contract was negotiated and fully 
executed and as there was no proof that Mr. Stephen could have paid the $33,935 (or more) in 
August 2004, Ms. Stephen r~spectfully argues the Court erred by revisiting this contract and 
setting it aside. 
2. Ms. Stephen Did Not Receive $2,000.00 Per Month. 
The Decree indicates that Mr. Stephen only had to pay Ms. Stephen $1,570.00 per month 
if Ms. Stephen lived in the Beach Street home. Mr. Stephen negotiated a deduction of$430.00 
per month (half of the mortgage payment for his now separate property mortgage) if Ms. Stephen 
lived in the home for two years, which the evidence confirmed she had. Based on this 
arrangement, Mr. Stephen was getting (at least) half of the mortgage on his now separate property 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 25 
paid and did not have to pay the full $2,000 per month. Yes, Ms. Stephen received a place to live, 
but Mr. Stephen benefited by offsetting the "equalization" payment $430 ($10,320) to apply to 
pay his mortgage. To be fair, if the Court was going to invalidate the "equalization" agreement, 
the Court should only have allotted $37,680 (24 x $1,570.00), not $48,000 when considering an 
offset. Based on this scenario, Mr. Stephen only paid $3,745 above the equalization figure of 
$33,935, so the Court should only have offset $3,745 from the damages figure ($41,000) and not 
$14,065. 
3. Ms. Stephen Is Entitled To Some Consideration. 
Based on the Court's' ruling, subtracting the "consideration" that Mr. Stephens had agreed 
to pay for the benefit of not having to pay Ms. Stephen $33,935 in August 2004 when it was due, 
there was not an equitable distribution in August 2004, as Ms. Stephen did not receive the 
equivalent of her $33,935 for two years. To equalize the distribution in August 2004, Ms. 
Stephen would be entitled to a reasonable interest rate to compensate her for not actually 
receiving this money when the decree was entered. 
B. APPELLANT SALLAZ IS PERSONALLY LIABLE. 
The Appellants' Attorney fee agreement does not single out Mr. Gatewood as the 
responsible attorney, but indicates that Ms. Stephen was hiring the attorneys of the firm. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 100.) Thereafter, Appellant Sallaz' name appeared on all pleadings in the top left 
hand margin as required by Rule 10(a)(I), IRCP. (See for example Plaintiff's Ex. 110, where both 
Sallaz and Gatewood are listed individually and they indicated they are Ms. Stephens 
"Attorneys.") Rule 10, IRCP requires all attorneys appearing for a party to be listed. 
























Based on these facts, Ms. Stephen established reasonable grounds to believe she had hired 
both Defendants Sallaz and Gatewood as her counsel and that as both of the attorneys had filed an 
appearance on her behalf, they may be liable to her personally. 
Appellant Sallaz was successful in convincing the Court that he had no personal liability 
to Ms. Stephen because he testified he never met her nor represented to her personally that he was 
her lawyer, despite the fact that he had appeared as her attorney of record in the divorce case. Ms. 
Stephen now argues that while Idaho Code § 30-1306, may act to insulate non-involved members 
of a Professional Limited Liability Company from liability for the negligent conduct of another 
member, such protection should not apply to an attorney who had actually appeared of record in 
the case. It would seem to contradict every duty that an attorney owes to a client to appear in a 
case, do absolutely nothing for the client, and then avoid responsibility by claiming the other 
attorney who also had appeared was responsible. Additionally, the evidence presented at trial 
established that Sallaz was clearly the more experienced attorney and as an attorney of record 
Sallaz had a duty to ensure his less-experienced partner acted appropriately. 
Ms. Stephen also established at trial that when she contracted for legal services, Sallaz and 
Gatewood was a general partnership. The Appellants, although thereafter forming a professional 
services corporation, failed to present any evidence the corporation had assumed, ratified or 
accepted any contracts for services made with the partnership. Nor did the Appellants seek to 
modify the partnership contracts to indicate Ms. Stephen was contracting with the new entity. 
Finally, the Appellants presented no evidence they had dissolved the partnership or intended to 
dissolve the partnership, or had filed the requisite Statement of Dissolution as required by I.e. § 
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53-3-805. 
As Ms. Stephen's contracted with the general partnership, and there is no evidence the 
partnership was dissolved or terminated, both Gatewood and Sallaz as the partners remain 
personally liable to Ms. Stephen for the negligence committed by either partner. I.e. § 53-3-306. 
C. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON HER CROSS APPEAL. 
Ms. Stephen also requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), City o/McCall v. 
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), and Rule 41, IAR; and costs according to Rule 40, 




1. There was substantial and competence evidence to support the Court's Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law - regardless of the Respondent's mental condition. This Court 
should therefore affirm Judge McLaughlin's decision. 
2. The District Court was correct in denying the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and 
judgmental immunity as the evidence indicates the Respondent was unaware of certain 
important facts and the Appellants failed to conduct even a minimal investigation 
regarding facts relevant to the divorce proceedings. This Court should therefore also 
affirm Judge McLaughlin's decision. 
3. As the prevailing party on this appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees and costs as 
claimed herein. 
CROSS APPEAL 
1. The Trial Court erred when it reduced the equalization payment to which the parties 
agreed in consideration for Mr. Stephen having 24 months to pay to equalize the 
community estate. The Respondent is entitled to an additional $14,065 in damages, and 







































asks this Court to remand the case with direction for entry of an amended judgment adding 
this amount, plus accruing post judgment interest. 
2. The Trial Court erred when it found that Appellant Sallaz was not personally liable to the 
Respondent, although the law firm was a partnership, and although·Sallaz had appeared as 
the Respondent's attorney of record, yet did nothing to ensure her case was pursued 
appropriately. On remand, the Respondent asks this Court to direct the District Court to 
amend the judgment to indicate.the judgment is entered against Appellant Sallaz 
individually. 
3. As the prevailing party on this cross appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees and 
costs as claimed herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of July, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
~-Respondent~ 
Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of July 2010, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Gary L. Quigley 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1296 
Meridian, ID 83680 
US Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent Sallaz and 
for Cross-Respondents Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD., and Scott Gatewood 
Eric R. Clark 
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